Polls conducted in June 2005 suggest even more anti-occupation sentiment; most alarming to U.S. policymakers is rising support for the insurgency. According to the Boston Globe 10 June 2005): ‘a recent internal poll conducted for the U.S-led coalition found that
nearly 45 percent of the population supported the insurgent attacks, making accurate
intelligence difficult to obtain. Only 15 percent of those polled said they strongly supported
the U S. -led coalition.” A later 2005 poll by British intelligence concurred that 45 per cent of
Iraqis support attacks against coalition forces, rising to 65 per cent in some areas, and that
82 percent are strongly opposed” to the presence of foreign troops. Demands for U.S.
withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq’s Parliament.
A great deal of attention has been focused on how much success the guerrillas have
had in consolidating support among the Iraqi population. It appears as though the Iraqi
resistance movement/insurgency retains a degree of popular support in the “Sunni triangle,”
especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal culture of the area and its concepts of honour, the
prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense
coalition “counter-insurgency” operations have resulted in the opposition of many Sunni
Arabs to the occupation.
Polls indicate that the greatest support for the insurgency is in al-Anbar province, a
vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western outskirts of Baghdad. This is
attributed to a number of reasons, including the lack the employment and opportunities of
the old regime, tribal customs, suspicion of outsiders, and the religious conservatism of the
area. Coalition “counter-insurgency” operations have suffered heavy casualties in the
province
Some observers, such as political scientist Wamidh Nadhmi, believe that the major
vision in Iraq is not along ethnic and religious divisions nor between the general population
and violent groups, but between those who collaborate with the foreign occupation and those
who resist it.
U.S. and British forces tend to suffer fewer casualties in the Shiite and Kurdish areas
outside the “Sunni triangle.” Many, however, especially in the Shiite community, although
supportive of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, are very unhappy with the occupation.
Farther north in the Kurdish areas, there some pro-U.S. sentiment and a strong opposition to
the groups constituting the insurgency.
Support for the insurgency is less strong in the Shiite areas of the country than in the
Sunni areas since the Shiites, like the Kurds, did not dominate the ruling factions of the old
regime. Shiites have also been influenced by a moderate clerical establishment under
Ayatollah All al-Sistani that has advocated a political solution. However, Moqtada al-Sadr (a
radical Shiite cleric who has advocated militant insurgency) has drawn support from a
portion of the Shiite community, mainly young and unemployed men in urban areas. Sadr’s
support varies region by region; while likely not drawing considerable support in Najaf (a
stronghold of the clerical establishment which was occupied by Sadr’s militia and has been
the scene of some of the heaviest fighting), some polls have indicated Sadr’s support among
the Shiites of Baghdad may be as high as 50%. However, this support did not translate into
direct electoral winnings for Sadr supporters during the January 2005 elections.
Spontaneous peaceful protests have appeared in Shiite areas against the
occupation. The Shiite intellectuals and the upper classes, as well as the inhabitants of rural
regions in the south and followers of more moderate clerics such as Ayatollah All al-Sistani,
tend to cooperate with the coalition and the Iraqi interim government and eschew militant
protest. Sistani’s political pressure is largely credited with enabling the elections of January
2005.
The Shite and Kurdish populations of Iraq have had long histories of strained relations with past Iraqi regimes, which have long been dominated by the Sunni. Their favoured status in Iraq since the 2003 U.S-led invasion is also a factor attributed to the fewer instances of attacks against coalition forces in Shitte and Kurdish regions of the country. This is in contrast to the more radical Moqtada al-Sadr, who draws his support from the lower classes and much of the Shiite urban population. Both united, however, on the United Iraqi Alliance ticket that brought in the largest share of the votes in the January 2005 elections.